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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  Rent control is common in coastal 
cities, but can take many complex 
forms.
n  Evictions from rent-controlled 
apartments tend to rise in booms 
and fall in busts.
n  Research shows that rent control 
incentivizes landlords to at least 
temporarily withdraw housing in 
response to price increases—the 
opposite of what policymakers intend. 
n  Rent control is unlikely to be a 
standalone solution to the underlying 
problem plaguing expensive cities: 
chronic undersupply of housing.
For additional details, see the working paper, 
“Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing 
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from 
Evictions in San Francisco,” published by the 
Upjohn Institute. https://doi.org/10.17848/
wp19-296.
After a long period of neglect, a new generation of policymakers and activists has 
embraced rent control as a solution to the housing affordability crisis plaguing America’s 
booming coastal cities. The national median rent for a one-bedroom apartment is $1,209 
a month, but for some metro areas it is considerably higher. Urban residents suffering 
from the highest rents are mostly in wealthy, coastal cities, such as San Francisco 
($3,500), New York City ($2,860), San Jose ($2,480), Los Angeles ($2,360), Oakland 
($2,100), and Washington, D.C. ($2,160). In addition to sharing astronomically high 
rents, these cities also share another feature: rent control.
Rent-control regimes have operated in these six cities for the better part of 30 years, 
and they exist also in a host of smaller cities, chiefly in California, Maryland, and 
New Jersey. Undergraduate Economics 101 would have you think that rent control 
is essentially a rent freeze, but the reality is that rent control as practiced today has 
evolved into a far more complex system. The vast majority of today’s rent controls were 
instituted in the 1970s and early 1980s in response to the stagflation crisis, and are often 
referred to as rent stabilization, tenancy rent control, or second-generation rent control 
to distinguish themselves from their much-maligned predecessor. Since these modern 
forms are really the only game in town, I refer to them herein as just rent control.
Policymakers claim that rent control can allow low- to moderate-wage workers to 
live close to jobs in expensive cities. They also claim that these rent-control policies 
would prevent families from being displaced by high rents into substandard housing. 
Even for families who stayed, the rent controls would mean that they could more easily 
afford other necessities, like food and health care. This concern applies particularly to 
low-income or fixed-income households, such as the elderly and disabled. For example, 
Oakland’s rent control ordinance claims to address a “severe housing affordability 
crisis,” in which “60 percent of . . . residents are renters, who would not be able to locate 
affordable housing within the city if displaced.”
The regimes share four prominent features:
1) The city grants landlords and tenants some freedom to negotiate a starting rent, 
and then caps subsequent rent increases according to agency decree or prescribed 
formula. This process, called vacancy decontrol, ranges from restrained in New York 
City and Washington, D.C., to completely unrestricted in California.
2) There is automatic lease renewal for existing tenants, and landlords usually require 
“just-cause” to evict a tenant. In practice, this means that landlords must prove to a 
rent board or court that tenants are being evicted for one of a predetermined list of 
reasons. This prevents landlords from turning over tenants at will and locking in new 
base rents in response to market shifts.
3) New buildings are exempt from rent control unless the landlord opts in. Policymakers 
fear discouraging new supply, so the rules control only existing buildings and commit 
to not extending controls further.
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4) There are a series of landlord hardship provisions, where landlords may petition to 
pass certain operating expenses on to tenants in order to cover costs with reasonable 
profit.
Table 1 shows how the details vary across cities, but it also underscores how these 
systems share more policy similarities than differences.
These measures were largely intended to be temporary, but like many so-called 
temporary regimes, rent control is the answer to an emergency situation that never 
seems to end. One reason for rent control’s persistence is that it redistributes benefits 
from future tenants to present ones. One influential study found that, after rent control 
was expanded to a new set of apartments in 1994 in San Francisco, tenants in affected 
buildings were 10–20 percent more likely to remain at their 1994 address compared 
to tenants in the control group. Since rent increases are capped at less than the rate of 
inflation, these tenants were (and in some cases still are) effectively being subsidized 
to live in their controlled apartments for as long as they like. This creates a powerful 
pro-rent-control constituency that can be difficult for reform-minded policymakers to 
overcome.
This de facto subsidy to stay in place affects tenants’ labor market outcomes. One 
study shows that tenants absorb longer commutes instead of yielding their rent-
controlled apartments, suggesting that keeping the subsidized housing is more valuable 
to them than moving closer to a new job or switching job markets altogether. Another 
study concluded that the stronger the local rent-control ordinance, the more likely a 
person was to limit their job search to local jobs. While rent control may allow workers 
to stay close to high-wage jobs in dense urban areas, it is not altogether clear that this is 
in the best interests of tenants or the economy in the long run.
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Economics 101 would 
have you think that rent 
control is essentially 
a rent freeze, but the 
reality is that rent control 
as practiced today has 
evolved into a far more 
complex system.
City Subject to 
controls if the 
building is...
Max annual 
allowable rent 
increase
Vacancy 
decontrol?
Just-cause 
evictions?
Rental stock 
coverage (%)
Los Angeles Built before 
10/1/1978 and 
has 2 or more 
units
Regional CPI 
rate, bounded 
within 3–8%
Yes Yes 85
Oakland Built before 
1/1/1983 and 
has 4 or more 
units
Regional CPI 
rate, max of 
10%
Yes Yes 66
New York City Built before 
1/1/1974 and 
has 6 or more 
units
Set by NYC 
rent guidelines 
board annually
No, rent 
increase for 
new base rent 
capped at 20%a
Yes 47
San José All rental units 
built before 
9/7/1979
Previously 8%
6/2016-: 5%
Yes No, city-
mandated 
arbitration 
instead
33
Washington, 
DC
An apartment 
building 
built before 
1/1/1976
CPI + 2%, max 
of 10%
No, rent 
increase for 
new base rent 
capped at 10%
Yes 66
San Francisco Built before 
6/13/1979 and 
has 2 or more 
units
60% of CPI, 
max of 7%
Yes Yes 72
Table 1  Major City Rent Control and Evictions Policies, October 2016
a In both cities, landlords can appeal for a rent increase on new base rents of up to 30% if rents in 
comparable units are shown to be higher.
NOTE: See Asquith (forthcoming) for detailed sources.
POLICY BRIEF | AUGUST 2019 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
3
Rent control’s distortionary effects also extend into housing supply. The policies in 
Table 1 collectively dampen landlords’ profits in the controlled market. In the case of San 
Francisco, landlords actually lose money since rent increases are capped at 60 percent of 
the inflation rate. In growing markets, the gap between what a landlord receives from a 
controlled apartment and from one that allows increases at the market rate compounds 
over time. Because tenants in this situation have strong incentives to stay longer under 
rent control, landlords in turn try to avoid tenants they suspect will be “long-stayers.”
My own research asks: How do landlords of rent-controlled properties change 
their housing supply when prices rise? Do they bring more units to market? Or, in San 
Francisco, at least, have policymakers imposed such burdens on landlords that they 
actually remove properties from the market? To motivate this question, Figure 1 shows 
evictions by quarter in San Francisco. The left axis shows Ellis Act evictions, by which 
landlords evict all tenants and withdraw an entire building from the market. Ostensibly, 
this occurs when landlords no longer want to operate their buildings, and so one might 
expect these evictions to rise when the economy slumps and vice versa. Instead, Ellis Act 
evictions spike during booms and fall during recessions. The right axis shows “just-cause” 
at-fault evictions, mostly tenants being evicted for delinquent rent. Since tenants in the 
controlled market are insulated from price increases during booms, one might expect 
this type of eviction to rise during recessions as tenants’ ability to pay falls. Instead, like 
Ellis Act evictions (albeit less sharply), at-fault evictions seem to rise in boom periods 
and level off in recessions.
These relationships suggest that landlords try to evade rent control restrictions 
when it would be especially profitable to do so, such as by converting rental units 
to condominiums. To test this hypothesis more definitively, I examine how two 
outcomes respond to market price increases that affected San Francisco neighborhoods 
differentially between 2003 and 2013. The first outcome is whether landlords tactically 
evict individual tenants to try to lock in higher rents from new tenants. More specifically, 
do landlords use just-cause evictions to expel long-standing but lower-paying tenants? In 
spite of the pattern in the graph, I find no statistically significant evidence that landlords 
do this. Instead the evidence suggests that landlords of rent-controlled apartments are 
less likely to turn over their tenants when prices rise.
The evidence suggests 
that  landlords of rent-
controlled apartments 
are less likely to turn over 
their tenants when prices 
rise.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data provided by the San Francisco Rent Board and Kate Pennington, 
University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 1  Evictions in San Francisco, 1993Q1–2018Q1
0
100
200
300
400
0
20
40
60
80
100
1993q1 1997q1 2001q1 2005q1 2009q1 2013q1 2017q1
Recession Ellis Act evictions At-fault evictions
010
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
02040608010
0 19
93
q1
19
97
q1
20
01
q1
20
05
q1
20
09
q1
20
13
q1
20
17
q1
Re
ce
ss
io
n
El
lis
 A
ct
 e
vi
ct
io
ns
At
-fa
ul
t e
vi
ct
io
ns
010
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
02040608010
0 19
93
q1
19
97
q1
20
01
q1
20
05
q1
20
09
q1
20
13
q1
20
17
q1
Re
ce
ss
io
n
El
lis
 A
ct
 e
vi
ct
io
ns
At
-fa
ul
t e
vi
ct
io
ns
The other outcome is whether controlled landlords outright exit the market in 
response to a price increase. I find that landlords do in fact respond to rising prices by 
withdrawing from the rental market via Ellis Act evictions (or, in smaller buildings, by 
withdrawing one unit from the market by claiming a relative needs to move in). This 
is a serious response, because by law the landlords must pay relocation fees and leave 
these units vacant (or filled by a family member) for at least three years or be subject to 
sanctions.
The two results confirm that the controlled market is distorted compared to “normal” 
housing markets. Landlords apparently expect to make such little money on the 
controlled market that they conclude it’s better to exit the market entirely, at least for a 
few years. If these landlords are thus incentivized to reduce supply as prices rise, it is hard 
to see how rent control improves housing market dynamics in these cities.
So, if existing evidence is that rent control is distortionary, why not abolish it? We 
have some evidence on what happens when rent control is repealed, and the result is 
generally salutary (see, for example, Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2017). In January 1995, 
a Massachusetts law banned rent controls, mostly affecting units in Boston, Cambridge, 
and Brookline. Property values in both decontrolled and never-controlled units rose, 
while property crime fell, especially in areas with the highest concentration of controlled 
units. Additionally, segregation may have decreased.
However, the evidence is not clear on whether low- and middle-income tenants in 
fact would have been better off without rent control. So, what are other remedies to help 
these groups with housing costs? Government programs have included Section 8 housing 
subsidies, low-income housing tax credits to finance new housing, and more recently, 
affordable housing mandates. These programs offer some help, particularly to poorer 
renters, but generally do little to address the housing needs of middle-income residents 
facing excessive rent burdens in expensive cities. Rent control’s lack of means testing is 
thus a political strength, because it can claim to be the rare policy that helps middle-
income renters as well.
Despite popular demands for government intervention on rents, economists typically 
advocate for increasing the housing supply. Frustratingly, there is little empirical evidence 
on what happens to rent prices when the number of housing units in a neighborhood 
rises, with one study suggesting prices may not move much. Upjohn Institute economist 
Evan Mast, Philadelphia Fed economist Davin Reed, and I are currently studying this 
issue using data on unit-level migrations, rents, and building openings.
Irrespective of the ultimate answer, rent control is here to stay. The current 
beneficiaries are well-organized, numerous, and know what they stand to lose from its 
repeal. The return of rent control to the scholarly agenda is thus propitiously timed to 
caution policymakers and a frustrated public that while soaring rent burdens are indeed 
approaching crisis levels in some places, rent control is a policy that has yet to deliver on 
its promise: affordable rents for all, not just for the few lucky enough to score a controlled 
apartment.
NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https://oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2680738&GU
ID=BAED7BF3-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6&Options=&Search= (accessed January 11, 2019).
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